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Tactics of dispossession: Access, power, and subjectivity at the extractive frontier

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In this article we analyse and theorise how power is exercised and subjectivities reworked to achieve and maintain socio-political order in areas of large-scale international extractive investment. Through a critical review of recent literature on the political ecologies of the international mining and hydrocarbon industries, we explore the strategies that firms and their allies deploy to secure and preserve the transformed relations of land and resource access upon which accumulation relies. Inspired by the work of John Allen we analyse these strategies with attention to the modalities and techniques of power used, highlighting the diverse ways socio-political stability is pursued despite the industry's destabilising effects. What emerges is that, contrasting the sector's reputation for coercion and domination, transformed regimes of access to land and resources at the extractive frontier are to a significant degree achieved and stabilised through what Allen calls the "quieter registers" of power. Attention to the varied and overlapping ways extractive firms and their allies exercise power to secure and maintain access to land and resources highlights limitations to David Harvey's influential accumulation by dispossession framework for understanding how extractive capital circulates into "new ground." It also directs attention to processes of subject formation at the extractive frontier, and to how industry expansion may be facilitated through the production of particular kinds of subjects. To illustrate this, we outline three interrelated ways subjectivities are reworked through peoples' encounters with the logics, materiality, and power of contemporary extractive industry. We suggest that those living in the shadow of large international extractive operations become extractive subjects.

KEYWORDS
accumulation by dispossession, extractive industry, land and resource access, power, subjectivity

1 | INTRODUCTION

The extractive frontier is a place of upheaval. As a now sizeable literature on the political ecologies of mineral, oil, and gas development shows, extractive capital moving into "new ground" transforms landscapes, reshapes livelihoods, and often sparks socio-political conflict (e.g., Ballard & Banks, 2003; Bury & Bebbington, 2013; Jacka, 2015; Kirsch, 2014). Historically, the tumult produced by extractive-industry expansion has been remarkable: in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea),

pollution impacts from the Panguna mine triggered a decade-long civil war in which thousands died (Kirsch, 2014); in Nigeria, decades of oil-industry-led dispossession led to what Watts describes as "an economy of violence," characterised by "a strange and terrifying underworld of armed insurgency, organized crime, state violence, mercenaries and shady politicians" (2012, pp. 456–447); in India, coal mining displaced an estimated more than one million people between 1950 and 1995 (Lahiri-Dutt et al., 2012, p. 41). Recent decades, meanwhile, have seen new rounds of extractive-industry expansion in many parts of the world, with numerous "greenfield" operations constructed in remote, peripheral regions (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Bridge, 2004a). In this same period, extractive projects have become larger, and thus more land- and resource-intensive (though dynamics in the hydrocarbon sector are more complex; Humphreys, 2015).[1] These processes have often entailed conflicts at the extractive frontier. In one industry survey, incidents of company–community conflict in the mining sector increased eight-fold in the period 2002–2013 (ICMM, 2015). To take the example of one country that has seen high levels of investment: for July of 2017, Peru registered 130 "socioenvironmental" conflicts, with 101 (78%) of these related to mining and hydrocarbon extraction (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2017).

While struggles linked to the expanding extractive frontier occur at different scales and across multiple axes (economic, environmental, political, social), the effects of extractive investment on relations of land and resource access often animate these struggles. In particular, conflicts commonly derive from the "separation" (see De Angelis, 2004) of people from their land and resources, either as firms "seize hold" (Harvey, 2003, p. 149) of these for production, or pollution renders environments unusable (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Budds & Hinojosa, 2012; Jacka, 2015; Perreault, 2013). For the industry, then, expansion is imbued with risk: as mining and hydrocarbon firms appropriate and degrade land and resources for accumulation, this can generate socio-political conditions that threaten profit-making (e.g., through production delays) or that otherwise constrain the ability of firms to benefit from these (or future) assets (Bebbington et al., 2008b; Franks et al., 2014; Golub, 2014).

Yet, across many parts of the world, the extractive frontier keeps expanding. This situation, we contend, demands further explanation. Taking up this task here, we analyse and theorise how – and with what effects – power is exercised to achieve and maintain socio-political order in areas of large-scale international extractive investment. Through a critical review of recent literature on the political ecologies of the international mining and hydrocarbon industries, we explore the strategies that firms and their allies deploy to secure and preserve the transformed relations of land and resource access on which accumulation relies.[2] Inspired by the work of John Allen (2003, 2004, 2011), we analyse these strategies with attention to the modalities and techniques of power used, highlighting the diverse ways socio-political stability is pursued despite the industry's destabilising effects. What emerges is that, contrasting the sector's reputation for coercion and domination, transformed regimes of access to land and resources at the extractive frontier are to a significant degree achieved and stabilised through what Allen (2011) calls the "quieter registers" of power. This analysis highlights limitations of David Harvey's (2003) influential accumulation by dispossession (ABD) framework for capturing the range of actors and forms of power involved in the expansion of extractive capital into new ground. Systematic attention to the multiple ways extractive firms and their allies exercise power also directs attention to heretofore underexplored processes of subject formation at the extractive frontier, and in particular to how industry expansion rests on the creation of certain kinds of subjects.

The next section summarises the drivers of extractive-industry expansion and its common effects on land and resource access, and evaluates ABD as a framework for understanding these dynamics. In the following sections, we introduce Allen's work on the geographies of power and engage it to interpret how power is deployed to secure and maintain transformed regimes of land and resource access at the extractive frontier. In the last main section, we draw together our analysis of the matrix of powers exercised by industry actors to outline how this reworks subjectivities. We propose three interrelated ways subjectivities are reconfigured in the extractive frontier, and suggest that those living in the shadow of large international extractive operations become extractive subjects.

2 | EXTRACTIVE-INDUSTRY EXPANSION AS ABD?

The impacts of extractive investment on land and resource access in producing regions derive from two main processes: extraction and waste elimination.[3] Mineral and hydrocarbon production are spatially fixed, asset-depleting activities. To secure their own futures, extractive firms thus regularly need to extend control over new deposits – a dynamic that gives the industry a "profound geographical restlessness" (Moore, 2007, p. 130). While states (which in most contexts claim ownership of the subsoil) are typically empowered to grant formal rights to exploit subterranean resources, gaining access to these usually requires firms to establish control over the surface lands above them. As such, securing ownership of sizeable amounts of contiguous surface land is often a prerequisite for constructing a modern, large-scale operation. Especially in the developing world, this may require the state's participation to transfer a complex patchwork of land rights into a single manageable claim (Bridge, 2004a; Himley, 2016; Levien, 2012). Further, the expansion of extractive capital requires

firms to accumulate rights to other resource inputs – for example, water and energy – and maintain access to these over time (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). In sum, industry expansion is commonly predicated on processes of capitalist dispossession in which people are separated from "the social means of subsistence and production" (Marx, 1967/1867, p. 668) and these assets are appropriated for capital accumulation – processes that typically involve (but, as we underscore below, are not limited to) the transfer of formal land and resource rights from their previous holders to extractive firms.[4] The literature makes clear that these land and resource appropriations often entail the destruction and/or displacement of existing production and livelihood systems (Bury, 2005; Jacka, 2015; Szablowski, 2002).

For their part, impacts of waste elimination in areas of large-scale extraction derive mainly from the sizeable and complex waste streams generated (Bridge, 2004b). These may include tailings and slags, chemical residues from ore treatment, emissions from smelting or flaring, or spillages. As wastes are "externalised" onto surrounding air, soil, and water resources, these may become unusable for other productive purposes (or human consumption), thus producing "indirect" dispossessions (Jacka, 2015; Perreault, 2013).

In geography, as across the social sciences, renewed interest in Marx's (1967/1867) insights on the origins of the capital relation, namely "primitive accumulation," has inspired work on the drivers and effects of capitalist expansion into "new" spheres and territories (see, e.g., De Angelis, 2001, 2004; Federici, 2004; Glassman, 2006; Hall, 2013; Perelman, 2001; Webber, 2008).[5] In particular, Harvey's (2003) reformulated concept of ABD has seen broad engagement to capture the processes and mechanisms that facilitate capital's circulation through enclosing new forms of property and/or extending existing enclosures (e.g., Bumpus & Liverman, 2008; Prudham, 2007; Sneddon, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2005). For Harvey (2003, p. 144), the ongoing relevance of ABD to contemporary capitalism derives from the fact that capital must consistently look "outside of itself" for solutions to crises of over-accumulation in which surplus capital lacks profitable outlets. The role of ABD is to "release" heretofore-unavailable assets that "capital can seize hold of and immediately turn … to profitable use" through mechanisms as wide ranging as privatisation and the credit system (Harvey, 2003, p. 149). While Harvey notes that "often violent processes of dispossession" (2003, p. 142) have occurred throughout capitalism's history, he argues that the salience of ABD rose in the 1970s with the spread of neoliberal policies emphasising the privatisation of state and collectively held assets and the extension of market relations.

While debates continue regarding the precise nature and boundaries of ABD (see Ashman & Callinicos, 2007; Glassman, 2006; Hall, 2013; Harvey, 2006; Jeffrey et al., 2011; Levien, 2012, 2013; Webber, 2008), as an analytical framework it continues to hold a strong influence in work on the role of asset appropriation in contemporary capitalist expansion, including in several studies focused on extractive industry (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2008b; Holden et al., 2011; Perreault, 2013). As Levien contends, the conceptual potency of ABD derives from "its ability to capture diverse contemporary dispossessions … whose significance for capital, at least in the proximate sense, lies more in the expropriated asset than in the dispossessed owner" (2012, p. 939). Indeed, as discussed below, extractive frontier expansion commonly entails a dynamic in which "places (or their resources) are useful, but the people are not" (Li, 2010, p. 69; see also Perreault, 2013). To the extent that ABD directs attention to processes of asset appropriation, namely the bringing of land/resources into circuits of accumulation (Levien, 2012), it is a compelling framework for understanding the role/function of dispossession in extractive expansion.

Our primary interest here, however, is not in the role/function of dispossession in extractive capitalism, but in the diverse ways power is deployed to secure dispossession, and to sustain reworked relations of land and resource access over time. In this regard, the ABD framework has clear limits, and in particular is ill-equipped to capture the range of actors and forms of power involved in extractive capital's circulation into new ground. This weakness derives, in part, from ABD's emphasis on changing property relations – that is, privatisation and enclosure – as the crux of capitalist expansion, and thus implicitly or explicitly positioning the state as the principal "extra-economic" facilitator of the process: guarantor of property rights, legitimiser of property transfers, even "land-broker" (Levien, 2012). As a result, ABD largely hinges on a nexus of state power and legitimacy. However, as we detail below, state authority at the extractive frontier is often uneven, and in this context firms themselves take a range of actions to appropriate land and resources, and maintain access to these over time, including in the face of resistance and socio-political tumult.

Such dynamics underscore the key distinction between property (the *right* to benefit from things) and access (the *ability* to benefit from them) (Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Sikor & Lund, 2009). Property may be a key component of access, but the two are not coterminous; formal rights to things (land, resources, etc.) do not guarantee the capacity to derive material benefits from them. Importantly, broadening out from the question of how things are appropriated as property to that of how access to these is secured and maintained over time "brings attention to a wider range of social relationships that can constrain or enable people to benefit from [them]" (Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 154). Here, the relevance for studies of subsurface resource extraction is clear, for, as we discuss below, industry expansion often requires firms to negotiate with a range of state and non-state actors to not only obtain rights to land and resources (e.g., through ownership or concession), but

also to preserve access to these over decades. This requirement leads firms to exercise diverse forms of power, with important implications for the kinds of subjects forged at the extractive frontier.

A second, related, issue with the ABD framework is a tendency among some authors to emphasise relations of force – namely "extra-economic" violence and coercion – as the principal means through which the process occurs. While Harvey roots his definition of ABD in its function for capital, rather than the means through which it is achieved (Levien, 2012), implicit in his writing is the idea that violence is central to ABD. He opens Chapter 4 of *The new imperialism* with a Rosa Luxemburg quotation claiming that "force, fraud, oppression, looting" characterise relations between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production (Harvey, 2003, p. 137). Later, he calls attention to ABD's "appalling violence" (Harvey, 2003, p. 165), refers to it as "vicious and inhumane" (Harvey, 2003, p. 173), and repeatedly uses Arundhati Roy's phrase "barbaric dispossession."[6] Meanwhile, Levien's (2012, p. 940) (re)definition of ABD – offered as a critical corrective to Harvey's arguably coarse-grained and sprawling one – hinges on the "use of extra-economic coercion" to expropriate assets for accumulation.[7] Of course, violence and coercion are integral to modern-day capitalism, and the effects of privatisation and enclosure may indeed be vicious and inhumane. However, below we show that this is a limited account in the case of extractive industry expansion, a process often involving diverse forms of power and "quieter" than commonly imagined.

We contend, in sum, that these facets of the ABD framework – its emphasis on property transfers (and concomitant positioning of the state as key actor) and a tendency to see force as the principal means through which capital circulates into new spheres and territories – limit its value for understandings dynamics at the extractive frontier. In particular, these aspects of the framework constrain its ability to capture the multiple actors and diverse modalities of power involved in securing the transformed relations of land and resource access on which industry expansion depends, and maintaining these over time. In attending to this complex mix of actors and power modalities, our analysis dovetails with a broader body of work exploring what might be termed the "quieter registers of dispossession."[8] This includes scholarship calling attention to ideology and discourse's role in enabling and justifying dispossession (e.g., Hart, 2006; Li, 2010), and work highlighting the role of the market in facilitating the separation of people from their means of production (and incorporation of these assets into capitalist circuits), including cases in which landowners "self-dispossess" (e.g., Elyachar, 2005; Hall, 2012; Webber, 2008; see also Li, 2014).

A critical benefit of our focus on how firms and their allies exercise power lies in the avenues it opens for exploring subject formation, an understudied topic in the critical social science literature on extraction. To explore this we draw on a growing literature on "capitalist subjectification" that underscores how contemporary capitalism rests on entrenching "a new political and economic subject, a new form of political reason, and above all a new form of governmental rationality and state legitimacy" (Brown, 2015, p. 51) – a process that often involves the reconstitution of elements of citizenship, such as rights, territoriality, and nation (see, e.g., Butler & Athanasiou, 2013; Elyachar, 2005; Hodkinson, 2012, Ong, 2006). While the broader literature on contemporary capitalist dispossessions has taken up questions of subject formation – with Elyachar arguing, for instance, that ABD "can succeed only if it creates new subjectivities on the ground" (2005, p. 214) – these analytical perspectives have not seen widespread engagement in work on subsurface resource extraction.[9] Yet, many of the tactics (and associated power modalities) deployed to secure and maintain land and resource access at the extractive frontier can be considered governmental technologies and rationalities that change political possibilities and produce new subjectivities. In the final main section, we explore three ways the literature shows such processes to be occurring in the context of international extractive industry, illustrating the wider implications of our attentiveness techniques of power, questions of access, and actors' diversity. Such an approach provides a foundation for theorising the multiple interplays of power and subjectivity at the extractive frontier, in particular as a means of addressing how extractive expansion may be achieved/stabilised *through* processes of subject formation.

The purpose of the next section is to begin to construct such a foundation. Through a synthetic review of recent literature, we highlight the remarkably diverse suite of strategies that extractive firms and their allies employ to appropriate land and resources and to maintain socio-political order at the extractive frontier. While research has engaged these multifaceted and complex strategies empirically, it has rarely done so theoretically or systematically, and it has given little sustained attention to the distinct modalities of power they entail. We advance such an analysis here, in conversation with Allen's work on the geographies of power.

3 | POWER AT THE EXTRACTIVE FRONTIER

Allen's (2003, 2004, 2011) work on power seeks to assess how a range of thinkers – from Arendt, to Foucault, to Giddens, to Weber – understand power and how it is exercised spatially. In doing so, he argues for understanding power as "a relational effect of social interaction" (Allen, 2003, p. 2). In this view, power is not a "thing" that can be held, wielded,

delegated, or made to radiate across space, but rather a mediated outcome of social interactions that may involve mobilising resources of various sorts (ideas, expertise, money, weaponry, etc.). Notably, Allen treats modalities of power (e.g., authority, coercion, domination, persuasion, seduction, manipulation) as analytically distinct. This is in part because, as Allen notes, "the many and varied modalities of power are themselves constituted *differently* in space and time" (2003, p. 3, emphasis in the original). Put another way, geography matters to the exercise of power, depending on the form of power exercised. For Allen (2003), modalities such as authority, domination, and coercion – which might be characterised as "power over" – are reliant on presence and proximity for functioning; they are less effective over distance and when mediated by other actors. Conversely, Allen argues that the "quieter" registers of persuasion, negotiation, manipulation, and seduction have a smoother reach over distance, rely less on proximity for their effectiveness, and tend to be more easily subverted and ignored.[10]

Allen also critiques the conceptualisations of power in Harvey's *The new imperialism*. In particular, Allen challenges what he refers to as Harvey's "top-down" conceptualisations of power, noting that while Harvey highlights tensions between political and economic logics of power, in his account both "still appear nonetheless to operate in a top-down fashion" and "the picture presented is often one of power more or less exchanged intact between scales" (2004, p. 22). This, Allen continues, leads to "an overblown sense of what centralised institutions are capable of bringing about at a distance" (2004, p. 22), in the process leading to a restricted view of spatial politics, which oscillates within binaries of domination and resistance. In contrast, Allen's approach recognises the multiple and diverse ways power is exercised. We consider this especially helpful for revealing the often-entangled nature of social relations at the extractive frontier.

Now, drawing on Allen's work, we explore the broader literature on extractive industry (and our own research) to analyse the strategies that enable continued industry expansion, despite the socio-political tumult often generated. We tackle six modalities of power before drawing this together to theorise subject creation on the extractive frontier. First, we address those for which the industry is best known: authority, coercion, and domination. Then, we examine the quieter registers, namely persuasion, seduction, and manipulation. While we do not consider Allen's taxonomy of power's modalities to be a final one,[11] it provides a valuable heuristic framework to probe the techniques that extractive firms and their allies utilise to secure and maintain access to land and resources. In the cases we discuss, forms of power being exercised overlap and interweave. Holding these modalities analytically distinct, however, sheds light on the range of state and non-state actors involved in the forms of asset reallocation on which industry expansion relies, underscores the prevalence of "quieter" strategies, and opens questions on the role of subject formation in securing and stabilising industry-led dispossession.

3.1 | Authority: State and other

Authority, in Allen's analysis, is a complex modality of power: a "peculiarly distinctive act" (2003, p. 3) that is recognised and conceded, and relies on maintaining recognition of its legitimacy over time. Authority, in other words, "does not involve the imposition of a form of conduct" (2003, p. 6), but rather aims to secure compliance through consent. While a variety of actors and entities seek to influence the actions of others through relations of authority, it is a modality most often associated with large bureaucratic organisations like the state. In the case of extractive industry, a principal way states exercise authority is through the creation, modification, and implementation of legal frameworks in matters of land and resource use. Typically, states claim (ownership of and) the ability to "dispose" of subsoil resources (e.g., by granting concessions to private operators), while also establishing and enforcing land laws and environmental regulations.

By changing and enforcing land-tenure laws to the advantage of extractive firms, state authority has been central to the contemporary expansion (and stabilisation) of the extractive frontier. The widespread liberalisation of land-tenure regimes in the 1990s allowed firms to purchase large swaths of surface land held by rural (often, smallholder) landowners: a process often seen as the root of later instability (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Bridge, 2004a; Bury, 2005). This role in facilitating the land-acquisition programmes of extractive operators has been studied across the world, including in South Asia (Lahiri-Dutt et al., 2012), Africa (Campbell, 2012; Emel & Huber, 2008), and Latin America (Bury, 2005; Bury & Bebbington, 2013). In some cases, state legal codes regarding land rights have been mobilised in order to evict populations from extractive sites, and to keep them out (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Bunker & Ciccantell, 2005). This strategy of relying on state authority (supplemented by its coercive powers) to enforce dispossession was seen by Frederiksen in Zambia, where a mining firm executive described his company's approach to evictions and claiming land as "lawyering up" to win legal cases.

State authority, nonetheless, is often dispersed, and open to challenge. The successful exercise of state authority to facilitate the sort of asset redistribution on which extractive-industry expansion relies requires those being "freed" of their land and resources to recognise the legitimacy of the state *and* consent to the transfer. Evidence suggests that, in practice, state authority alone can rarely (if ever) be relied on to achieve such ends; other strategies are required (Indeed, it is often

difficult to disentangle the exercise of state authority from state strategies involving coercion, domination, seduction, etc.). Limits to state authority derive, in part, from the fact that in many of the hinterland areas where today's large-scale extractive operations are established, state presence is uneven.

Further, actors other than the state claim authority in matters of land and resource access, and through vectors other than the law. As firms pursue exploitable subsoil resources in peripheral regions, they often encounter ambiguous property relations and find themselves negotiating access with a variety of traditional, non-state authorities (Himley, 2016; see also Sikor & Lund, 2009). Horowitz, for instance, describes a conflict in New Caledonia involving both pro- and anti-mining groups struggling to claim customary authority, "using the customary authorities precisely as pawns, for the legitimacy they represented" (2014, p. 96). Such dynamics illustrate how obtaining formal land and resource rights (even when ostensibly guaranteed by the state) does not equate to securing access (i.e., ability to benefit). Within industry circles, this is reflected in the now-common assertion that firms must obtain a "social licence to operate." While there is much to critique about how the notion of a "social licence" has been imagined and applied (e.g., Owen & Kemp, 2013), the ubiquity of the phrase underscores the complex landscape of authority extractive firms navigate in their efforts to gain stable, long-term access to subsurface deposits.

Again: authority – both state and non-state – relies on legitimacy to function, and as such must be recognised to have an effect (Allen, 2003). When, as Allen (2003) suggests, recognition of authority is withheld or withdrawn, strategies may shift, with other modalities coming more into play.

3.2 | Coercion and domination

Coercion, following Allen (2003), involves the threat of force to secure compliance; domination the application of force. One need not look far in the literature on extractive industry to find these modalities employed at the extractive frontier. Extraction's brutish reputation is not for nothing: scholars, activists, and the popular press have documented many cases in which the threat or use of force has been employed to secure land and resource access and to maintain socio-political order in extractive regions. While, in recent decades, many industry actors have committed to upholding human rights, firms and allied states continue to utilise coercion and domination, including violence, in areas targeted for investment (Coleman, 2013; Middeldorp & Le Billon, 2019; Watts, 2012).[12] Even where the threat of violence is never realised, "the possession of means of violence … can create a climate in which force acts quite effectively without ever being used" (Hall et al., 2011, p. 17). Examples of extractive industry and its allies marshalling tools of coercion and domination to impose their will include: Colombia, where paramilitaries "disappeared" and imprisoned opponents to BP's oil investments in Casanare (Coleman, 2013); Guatemala, where mine security and police killed opponents of the Marlin mine (Slack, 2012); Indonesia, where managers of the Batu Hijau mine and local elites prompted village leaders to attack environmental activists (Welker, 2009); Tanzania, at Acacia Mining's North Mara operation, where villagers entering mine property in search of valuable minerals have been killed (York, 2014); and West Papua, where security forces oppressed peoples impacted by BHP Billiton's Ok Tedi mine (Kirsch, 2014). In cases like these, "power over" tactics have been used not to convince or persuade, but to overrule, subdue, silence, or drown out.

Among these diverse cases, two trends stand out. One is the ongoing securitisation of extractive sites, a phenomenon documented, for instance, in the oil-producing regions of Africa (Ferguson, 2006; Van Alstine et al., 2014) and Latin America (Coleman, 2013). The second is the intertwining of public and private power. Extractive firms customarily host their own private security operations complete with investigative and intelligence arms. They also often maintain linkages with public-security forces (police, army, etc.) – relationships that may include joint patrolling or the direct support of local police. The diffuse line between public and private power is illustrated in the case of Acacia Mining's North Mara mine (cited above); in Germany, where the lead officer for policing protest against the Hambach mine had been a member of the operating company's advisory board until immediately before the protest action (Brock & Dunlap, 2018); and in Colombia, where paramilitaries repressing resistance to oil operations used army bases to coordinate operations (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, n.d.; Coleman, 2013).

For extractive firms, coercion and domination can at times be effectively employed to appropriate land and resources and to stabilise the reordered socio-ecological relations on which expanded extraction relies. Given the attention-grabbing nature of these acts, often visible to broader publics, it is tempting to believe that brute force is, in fact, the principal means through which control over land and resources is secured. However, while acts of force and violence have long characterised extractive sites, they are not ubiquitous; nor, the literature suggests, are they the most effective means for generating the socio-political conditions needed for industry expansion. They are resource intensive and their visibility (and often shocking nature) means these acts are apt to attract international press coverage (see Kirschke, 2013), with potentially

deleterious effects on share price and investor confidence, or other headaches for firms (Frederiksen, 2018). Moreover, the threat or use of force may energise resistance, contributing to further instability. That coercion and domination cannot be relied on to stabilise socio-political relations in extractive regions is evidenced by the range of more nuanced, discrete techniques that firms and their allies have mobilised.

We now turn to these quieter registers of power. These do not seek to change behaviour through compulsion or duress or involve acts of blanket constraint (as, for instance, with domination). Rather, these modalities – which include persuasion (where intent is revealed) and manipulation and seduction (where it may not be) – work more through the arousal of interests (or even simple curiosity), seeking to induce people to conduct themselves in particular ways.

3.3 | Persuasion

The expansion of the extractive frontier often entails negotiations between a firm and the holders of the land and resources it seeks to appropriate. The literature reveals various persuasive tactics that firms and their allies utilise to facilitate these negotiations. Especially prevalent is offering compensation in the form of money, employment, or other benefits (e.g., relocation and/or development programmes), and codifying these offers in quasi-legal "impact and benefits agreements" or "community development agreements" with local stakeholders (Himley, 2010; Li, 2015; O'Faircheallaigh, 2016; Peterson St-Laurent & Billon, 2015). Compensation programmes may provide land and resource holders in areas of extractive investment with assets to replace those lost to industry expansion. However, negotiations over compensation are rarely between equals, and evidence abounds of local communities receiving poor deals, especially when firms themselves organise and direct negotiations (Himley, 2016; Lahiri-Dutt et al., 2012; Szablowski, 2002). Szablowski documents how, at Peru's Antamina mine, the firm sought to curtail relocation negotiations and "select the 'entitled' group according to its own criteria, decide upon a compensation plan, then approach the group while seeking to compel it to accept the plan without change" (2002, pp. 266–267). Horowitz, in her study of mining protests in New Caledonia, argues "the more economically and politically vulnerable a population is, the more easily a company is able to manipulate or intimidate it into accepting environmental and social harms in return for the promise of benefits" (2014, p. 90). In these situations, affected groups may feel powerless to challenge the terms of industry compensation. As one community member put it to Horowitz, "It's better to sign so as to have something than not to gain anything at all" (2014, p. 97).

Two points stand out here. First, while the exchange of formal property rights (for money) may be at the centre of negotiations between firms and land and resource holders at the extractive frontier, the complex power relations in which these negotiations are embedded and the use of non-monetary compensation programmes (with timeframes often extending well beyond the property transfer itself) as a negotiating tactic make these transfers anything but "ideal" market transactions (Himley, 2016; Szablowski, 2002). Second, negotiations over issues of compensation and benefit distribution rarely end when firms have obtained formal rights to land and resources. When the interests and desires of affected populations remain unsatisfied, resentment can grow into claims-making, obstructionism, and socio-political instability (e.g., Franks, 2015; Golub, 2014; Jacka, 2015). At the Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea, for example, Golub describes how, years after relocation, local communities "felt cheated by what the mine had wrought and deeply entitled to more than they had received" (2014, p. 30) despite getting, by standards of the time, generous compensation.

To mollify disruptive behaviours and preserve order in extractive zones (or, to maintain their "social licence"), firms have rolled out a wide variety of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes in their areas of operation (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Frederiksen, 2017; Hilson, 2012; Himley, 2013; Jacka, 2015; Slack, 2012; Welker, 2014). CSR programmes show institutional heterogeneity (from company-led approaches to corporate foundations to partnerships with NGOs or government agencies) and target a range of populations. These programmes typically seek to link company success and community prosperity by including local populations in the extractive endeavour in ways that disincentivise opposition. The progressive expansion of CSR in the post-construction period is shown by Bebbington et al. (2008b), who note that between 1999 and 2004, spending on social responsibility at Peru's Yanacocha mine increased almost nine-fold, while local contracting and purchasing increased almost seven-fold. In 2012, the 15 largest mining companies spent a combined US $1.7 billion on community investment (Franks, 2015).

Efforts to align the interests of affected populations with those of the industry (and thus persuade these populations to support the extractive endeavour) may also involve the state. For instance, resource rents can be redistributed to create new forms of economic inclusion. In Peru, local and regional governments where mining firms operate receive 50% of their income taxes, with conditions that these funds be used for development projects (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). Similar schemes are in place in Ghana (Tsuma, 2010) and Papua New Guinea (Ballard & Banks, 2003); and in Bolivia and Ecuador, hydrocarbon rents finance social programmes (Bebbington, 2009; Lu et al., 2017). Such redistributive policies can promote a

populist resource politics in which extractive industry is painted as a mechanism for social uplift (Ballard & Banks, 2003). They can also lead to corruption and inter-regional tensions (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Tsuma, 2010). Other persuasive tactics focus on co-opting or placating elites at local, regional, or national levels. Firms may support elite organisations (chambers of commerce, industry associations), award supplier contracts to particular companies, or secure elite support through simple bribery (Frederiksen, 2017).

A notable trait of negotiations to achieve and stabilise industry expansion is a growing use of participatory and consultative mechanisms (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Himley, 2014a; Horowitz, 2014; Li, 2015; Perreault, 2015). For firms, being able to constructively engage with local communities is seen as "a key … competency and a means to deflect or ameliorate criticism and build legitimacy" (Mayes et al., 2014, p. 399). In some cases, participatory mechanisms have had promising results for affected populations. Slack, for instance, argues that at Peru's Tintaya mine, "a truly participatory and respectful process of dialogue" contributed to "the community's support for the project and relatively little conflict" (2012, p. 184). However, studies also show how firms and governments deploy participation as a tactic: a strategy not for promoting community empowerment, but for circumscribing dissent and extending control (e.g., Coleman, 2013; Himley, 2014a; Li, 2015). Ostensibly "open" or "democratic" participatory techniques can permit or generate exclusions, including through the selective engagement and marginalisation of community members (cf. Cooke & Kothari, 2001). In Western Australia, BHP Billiton created community groups as a way of bringing sympathetic local populations "into the fold" (claiming these groups represented the wider population), while the "detrimental impacts experienced by local community members were … isolated as individual 'complaints'" (Mayes et al., 2014, p. 404). Horowitz (2014) documents a similar dynamic in New Caledonia, where Vale sought to bypass a problematic environmental group by drawing less-hostile elements of the area population into consultations. Through the selective enrolment of local populations into decision-making processes, participatory mechanisms can enable firms to set the terms of debate over industry expansion, including by channelling dissent into institutions capable of resolving conflicts within parameters set by companies and their allies (Coleman, 2013; Himley, 2014a; Horowitz, 2014; Li, 2015). More broadly, while CSR and participatory community engagement programmes can be strategies for producing "socially thick" extractive economies (see Ferguson, 2006), these can also perform the antipolitical function of "rendering technical" fundamentally political challenges to extraction, turning processes of industry expansion into questions of socio-economic development and benefit distribution (Coleman, 2013; Frederiksen, 2017; Li, 2007).

3.4 | Seduction

Efforts to align the interests of industry with those whose access to land and resources has been impacted by extractive investment (or, with broader publics) often entail promoting seductive visions of the future to which extraction is central. Extractive-industry growth commonly begets a cultural politics in which apprehension and anxiety are mixed with excitement and expectation (Bebbington et al., 2008a; Bridge, 2004b). Firms aiming to secure rural populations' lands and resources may work not only to compensate and/or allay concerns, but also to seduce through visions of industry-led progress and modernity (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Ferguson, 1999). Community leaders in north-western Zambia recalled local politicians promising that "all your problems will be solved" when new mining firms sought to enter the area, invoking memories of company towns built in the 1930s (Frederiksen, 2019). In Peru, residents of a community that sold land to the Pierina mine remember firm negotiators pledging to make the community "modern" (Himley, 2010); and at Antamina negotiators sold a vision "that the mine would bring large-scale, secure employment for the local people of the region" (Szablowski, 2002, p. 261). More broadly, the discourse of Peru being a "mining country" (*país minero*) legitimises extractive expansion by positing mining to be central to Peru's historical identity and future development – universalising the interests of the mining sector to the entire nation (Himley, 2014b).

Such discursive efforts to sell and naturalise extractive-industry expansion may serve to exclude as much as include (Bridge, 2001). Associating extraction with progress and modernity allows industry actors to cast opponents as "anti-progress" or "anti-modern." Across the world, individuals and organisations campaigning against the effects or actions of industry are labelled as "anti-extraction" or even "terrorism" (Brock & Dunlap, 2018) – their critique dismissed as an unreasonable attack on all forms of subsurface resource development. These discursive exclusions can have ethnic or racial dimensions. In 2008, Peru's then-President Alan García said indigenous groups opposed to resource development in the Peruvian Amazon wanted to lead the country "to irrationality and retrograde primitivism" (quoted in Bebbington, 2012, p. 115). Welker illustrates similar discursive tactics by mine managers depicting Indonesian villagers who demonstrated against the mine as "'backwards,' 'irrational,' 'emotional,' and 'spoiled'" (2009, p. 167; cf. Ballard & Banks, 2003).

3.5 | Manipulation

The literature offers numerous examples of dishonesty, false promises, broken agreements, and unmet expectations, despite efforts to develop formal frameworks for negotiations over asset transfers at the extractive frontier (Lahiri-Dutt et al., 2012; Szablowski, 2002).[13] At the least, as Slack notes, "companies often downplay (or ignore entirely) the costs to communities of their operations, while exaggerating (implicitly or explicitly) the benefits projects are likely to bring" (2012, p. 18). Szablowski notes that the Antamina pledge of employment (cited above) was a promise "they would have known to be false" (2002, p. 261). Indian coal companies have used outright deception to appropriate land. In a striking example, documented by Lahiri-Dutt et al., company officials took a landholder ill with tuberculosis to the hospital, where he

> was then asked to put his thumb impression on some papers, which he thought were related to his medical treatment. Later, it transpired that they were legal papers sealing the sale of his inherited land. Back in the village, the representatives opened a bank account for [him] to deposit the compensation money. (2012, p. 39)

Beyond these concrete instances of manipulation, some consider CSR, in general, to be a strategy of deception: for Kuyek (2006), a method for "legitimating plunder"; for Slack, "window dressing that serves a strategic purpose of mollifying public concerns about the inherently destructive nature of extractive industries operations" (2012, p. 179). From these perspectives, CSR is not a method of offering redress or participation to those impacted by industry expansion; rather, it seeks to manipulate the debate surrounding extraction by offering a narrative of industry-led development and distracting from messy processes of dispossession and displacement.

3.6 | The quieter registers of industry expansion

The literature on extractive industry suggests, in sum, that industry expansion into new ground involves a range of actors who exercise power in diverse ways. That tactics involving persuasion, seduction, and manipulation feature prominently in the literature suggests that these are significant modes of power exercised by extractive industry to gain and maintain access to land and resources, and that extraction's reputation for force and violence belies a more prevalent reality. Work on these subtler tactics underscores that the moment of property rights transfer is typically followed by a longer, less visible, period of managing those dispossessed. Here, securing socio-political stability is a central problematic – one not just of property ownership but, crucially, *access* to that property – as the success of industry expansion requires maintaining access over time, including by minimising volatility and disruption.[14] The condition of uneven state presence that typifies the extractive frontier often then necessitates the direct involvement of firms (and allied actors) to stabilise these reconfigured socio-ecological landscapes. For firms, tactics involving the quieter registers may be "hit-or-miss" (Allen, 2003, p. 10); they may be resisted or simply misunderstood, often requiring ongoing recalibration (see Welker, 2014). They can, however, help to resolve issues of legitimacy raised by rapidly reordered socio-ecological relations, utilising fewer resources than domination or coercion (in the form, e.g., of sustained military presence), and with less reliance on direct mediation or the state (and thus may be "outsourced" to third parties, like NGOs). While, for Allen (2003), the quieter registers of power rely less on presence and proximity (compared with domination, coercion, etc.), the literature indicates that the roll out of dispossession's quieter tactics (CSR programmes, participatory mechanisms, etc.) leads firms to become increasingly entangled and influential in socio-political life in extractive regions. Collectively, these forms of entanglement and influence direct attention to processes of subject formation, as we now explore.

4 | EXTRACTIVE SUBJECTIVITIES

The tactics used to achieve and to stabilise reordered regimes of land and resource access at the extractive frontier have a series of politico-material consequences for populations living in the shadow of large-scale, capital-intensive extractive operations. Here, we outline an argument for thinking through these tactics as governmental technologies and rationalities that change socio-political possibilities and produce new subjectivities. In particular, we identify three interrelated ways that firms and their allies transform subjectivities: (1) by reworking forms of exclusion and inclusion in ways that serve the interests of firms, (2) by reshaping lifeworlds in areas targeted for investment, and (3) by transforming state–society–market relations, with firms assuming state-like functions and subjecting them to capitalist logics. We do not imply the production of a singular subjectivity in extractive regions or that companies simply impose their will on quiescent populations (The above discussion is predicated on the opposite being true). We are also keenly aware that subject formation at the extractive

frontier occurs in relation to multiple contextual factors like existing social divisions (racial, ethnic, gendered, generational, etc.) and within histories of previous encounters with resource economies (Bebbington et al., 2018; Frederiksen, 2019; Himley, 2014b; Lu et al., 2017). Nonetheless, we suggest that socio-political life in these areas often becomes dominated by the extractive enterprise to the extent that "extractive subjects" come into being.

First, a tension infuses our analysis in the preceding section: firms and their allies often respond to the dispossessions and exclusions generated by industry growth by creating new kinds of incorporation and inclusion (cf. Ballard & Banks, 2003). The existence (and proliferation) of these incorporation/inclusion strategies reflects the fact that, for firms and their allies, the simple exclusion of the dispossessed creates risks, namely subjects with little or no interest in supporting or maintaining the systems that produced their exclusion (Hall et al., 2011; Perelman, 2000). The excluded subject is thus potentially politically volatile. The form that these strategies take, meanwhile, reflects the industry's shifting labour needs, with today's capital-intensive, technologically advanced operations tending to directly absorb only very few of those dispossessed by industry expansion into the extractive labour market (Himley, 2013; Jacka, 2015; Perreault, 2013; Welker, 2014). While these groups may find themselves, over time, integrated into capitalist relations, little suggests that international extractive firms' need to appropriate land and resources is linked to a concomitant need to recruit the dispossessed as labourers. Strategies of incorporation/inclusion thus typically takes different forms.

In particular, the literature suggests three broad approaches the industry takes to address the exclusions it generates. The first is *consolidating the exclusion* by supporting livelihood opportunities in extractive regions not linked to the extractive economy. The focus here is on limiting local "dependence" on the extractive economy through, for instance, relocation programmes that provide land to dispossessed farmers, projects supporting sustainable small-scale agriculture, or tourism initiatives (see Welker, 2014). A second centres on *compounding the exclusion* – by layering discursive atop material exclusion (e.g., through the construction of the "external agitator" or "irrational" critic), thus marginalising potential dissenters. A third, *counteracting the exclusion*, involves generating forms of economic and socio-political inclusion that assimilate individuals and groups into the extractive endeavour in new ways – for instance, through the creation of "the stakeholder," who participates in consultations; "the extractive citizen," who benefits from redistributive policies; "the entrepreneur," who remakes themselves as a contractor or service provider; or "the beneficiary," who is compensated through CSR programmes. In sum, we suggest that an exclusion–inclusion dialectic lies at the heart of many struggles over industry expansion and is central to producing extractive subjects, with inclusion and exclusion understood as simultaneously material and discursive processes that are entrenched within rationalities of capitalist extraction and that refashion subjectivities by embedding individuals within a political space that encourages some behaviours and circumscribes or represses others.

Second, extractive firms – intentionally and not – contribute to processes of subject (re)formation by reshaping lifeworlds in extractive regions, including for those not directly dispossessed. Through their presence and actions, large-scale extractive operators generate massive socio-environmental transformations – often, in the process, radically redefining livelihood possibilities. Welker provides evidence of this in a visceral description of conducting fieldwork in a mining region in Indonesia:

> Every time I left … Newmont's corporate headquarters, I had the sensation of leaving Newmont behind … In the villages of Sumbawa, by contrast, the idea of Newmont was omnipresent. It was there in what we had and what we lacked: in our drinking water; … in the paved roads and potholes; in the markets, schools, public toilets, and drainage ditches; and in the apples workers brought home from the mine. (2014, p. 7)

As they operate in what are often remote, rural areas, extractive firms create new economic flows, forms of employment, migrations, and infrastructure; they transform land markets, existing institutions, and relations with the state and global markets; they consume land and resources, and exert a strong, often controlling, influence on physical environments. People in these regions find themselves "profoundly integrated" into wider systems of global capitalist resource extraction (Brown, 2015, p. 83). The social changes triggered by the arrival of an extractive company often reverberate for decades. Golub captures this at the Porgera mine (Papua New Guinea), where residents' initial optimism turned within a decade into feelings of being "strangers in their own land, overwhelmed by migrants from elsewhere" (2014, p. 210). Importantly, however, all this does not imply long-run stability: tied in new ways to the rhythms of the global capitalist economy, extractive subjectivities are, by nature, unstable – not only rooted in the exploitation of non-renewable resources, but also exposed to the vicissitudes of global commodity markets, and to the decisions of distantly headquartered firms. These subjectivities require continual reproduction.

Third, for extractive subjects, the presences, rules, beliefs and actions of extractive firms can be more influential in their lives than those of distant states (Ballard & Banks, 2003). A firm's entrance often transforms patterns of state–society–market

relations in profound ways, with implications for how rights and responsibilities are conceived, and for the economic, social, and political claims that area populations can reasonably and reliably make (Campbell, 2012). Notably, while firms often play an outsized role in governance at the extractive frontier (i.e., Newmont's "omnipresence"), this may not be the desire of companies. In some cases, as Szablowski describes in Peru, the state engages in a "strategy of selective absence" (2007, p. 45), in the process leaving companies to negotiate community claims. While firms can self-consciously place themselves between citizens and national and local states (e.g., Mayes et al., 2014), sprawling interventions into the lives and livelihoods of local populations can equally come in response to community demands (e.g., Welker, 2014). In contexts where opportunities to extract benefits from a distant and partially present state are limited, communities may focus their efforts on the proximate and obviously wealthy extractive firm, in turn adopting their languages and rationalities (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Frederiksen, 2017). Here, populations, too, may hold modernist visions of progress and consider extraction to be a key way to achieve them, focusing protest and claims-making on capturing a greater share of extraction's benefits (Ferguson, 1999; Himley, 2013; Li, 2015).

5 | CONCLUSION

In this paper we have explored how the contemporary politics of international extractive industry is "quieter" than dominant narratives have led us to believe, with consequences for subject formation at the extractive frontier, and how we understand it. Without diminishing the often-abhorrent methods of force and violence that industry actors utilise, we contend that understanding how extractive capital circulates into new ground requires a broader focus. Such a focus highlights limitations of the ABD framework for capturing dynamics at the extractive frontier, in particular regarding the framework's emphasis on state-organised formal property transfers as the lever of capitalist expansion, as well as a tendency to present violence and coercion as the principal means through which expansion occurs. Highlighting the diverse range of strategies (and associated power modalities) that extractive industry mobilises to secure and maintain access to land and resources has led us to direct attention to – and attempt to shed light on – dynamics of subject formation at the extractive frontier.

The significance of this line of analysis, we contend, lies not just in its capacity to contribute knowledge of the complex effects of industry expansion on sociopolitical life in areas targeted for investment. More importantly, the significance of our analysis lies in its ability to advance a theoretical understanding of how extractive expansion is facilitated by – indeed, may rest on – the creation of particular kinds of (extractive) subjects. It is for this reason that we consider the question of subject formation to be a critical avenue for future geographical (and broader social science) research on extraction. Not only will such a focus bring this work on extractive industry in line with the wider literature on contemporary capitalist subjectivities (e.g., Brown, 2015; Butler & Athanasiou, 2013; Hodkinson, 2012, Ong, 2006), it will also serve to hone our analyses of why and how extractive industry continues to expand, despite its proclivity for generating tumult and conflict.

Finally, we note that the geography of critical research on the extractive sectors does not map evenly onto the geography of extraction. Extraction features on every continent, excluding Antarctica, and some countries are over-represented in the literature (e.g., Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and Peru). While the number of extractive sites studied reaches into the hundreds, this but scratches the surface. Globally, there are hundreds of thousands of large and small mines, quarries, and oil and gas rigs.[15] No small portion of these will have displaced previous land uses, and emitted pollution that disrupts livelihoods for nearby populations. In this light, we suggest that research should not only analyse the emergence and nature of conflict surrounding industry growth (as much of the existing literature does),[16] but also advance understandings of the mechanisms and power relations through which extractive capital successfully expands – and may do so "quietly." A way forward lies in the argument advanced here: underpinning extraction's attention-grabbing and contradictory tendency to generate contestation and instability is a quieter constellation of stabilising powers and reconfigured subjectivities.

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ENDNOTES

[1] Our focus is on large-scale, capital-intensive extractive operations, which tend to be constructed and operated by large international firms. While many processes we discuss could equally apply to smaller-scale operations, a thorough analysis of dynamics of small-scale extraction is beyond the scope of this paper.

[2] The literature on which we base our analysis focuses primarily on cases from the Global South. This is, in part, a reflection of the fact that recent decades have seen a spatial restructuring of extractive investment globally, with much investment going to developing countries (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Bridge, 2004a). This often entails the expansion of extractive operations into peripheral – or "frontier" – regions with little or no history of extraction. That said, we do not claim that the dynamics studied here are particular to the Global South, especially given that much extractive development in wealthier countries (e.g., Canada and Australia) often occurs in remote areas home to historically marginalised populations.

[3] Our focus is below-ground extraction. While we note differences between mineral and hydrocarbon extraction (regarding, for instance, geopolitical linkages, spatial footprint of operations, technologies employed, wastes generated), we also recognise commonalities, including strategies for achieving and stabilising industry expansion. For this reason, we analyse international extractive industries in general.

[4] We adopt a relatively capacious definition of dispossession. For instance, contra some writers (e.g., Levien, 2012), we do not exclude asset transfers realised through the market from the category of dispossession, for we believe that such an a priori exclusion rests on a depoliticised understanding of the market (see Hall, 2013). Indeed, as discussed further below, land transfers at the extractive frontier, even when realised through the market, are often characterised by highly uneven power relations, and firms and their allies commonly employ a mix of strategies to coerce and/or induce people to sell rights to their assets.

[5] For Marx, primitive accumulation involves radical changes to the social relations of work and property, including the expropriation and enclosure of the social means of production (namely land) and the creation of the proletariat, a class of "free" landless workers with "nothing to sell except their own skins" (Marx, 1967/1867, p. 667). While ensuing work tended to focus on the proletarianisation dimension of primitive accumulation (e.g., Webber, 2012), much recent work, including Harvey (2003), foregrounds changing property relations – that is, privatisation and enclosure – in the reproduction and expansion of the capital relation.

[6] Such depictions parallel a long history of writing on the violence of primitive accumulation (e.g., Perelman, 2001).

[7] Understandings of ABD often hinge on the distinction between "economic" and "extra-economic" actors and actions (e.g., Glassman, 2006, Perreault, 2013). Our analysis of extractive-industry expansion underscores the often blurred line between these.

[8] We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this phrase.

[9] Exceptions include Gustafson (2019), Lu et al. (2017), and Valdivia (2005), with the first of these using the term "extractive subject" similarly to how we do here, but in the specific context of natural gas development in Bolivia. We also note that studies of other resource sectors, such as logging, have addressed questions of subjectivity (e.g., Peluso & Vandergeest, 2001).

[10] While the spatiality of power is a core aspect of Allen's analysis, space constraints do not allow for a comprehensive exploration of it in the context of extractive industry. However, we do draw attention to instances in which dynamics at the extractive frontier diverge from Allen's characterisations.

[11] As Ribot and Peluso (2003, p. 162) note, no such taxonomy could be final given the complexity of ways power operates across space and time.

[12] Here, we consider what might be termed "direct" violence. We acknowledge that violence can be understood as a spectrum of activities that impair others, including the structural violence of normalised wage relations (see Tyner & Inwood, 2015). Our aim, though, is to hold analytically distinct a range of modalities of power; a broad conception of violence is inimical to this.

[13] For example, the World Bank's Operational Policy 4.12 on involuntary resettlement.

[14] This is not an argument for any necessary temporal sequencing in modalities of power at extractive sites; neither the literature nor our own research suggests clear temporal patterns across the life cycles of operations.

[15] In 2015, for example, there were 36,155 mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction "establishments" in the USA, and 19,000 mines and quarries in the European Union (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016; Eurostat, 2015).

[16] For Tania Li (personal communication, 2017), this focus on areas of the world with visible conflict is a result of flawed methodology – that when researchers choose cases, they often are looking to "find the action," and thus the literature as a whole generates a biased sample. For Tony Bebbington (personal communication, 2019) the geography of research on extraction is the consequence of extractive industries arriving in countries already over-represented in research on rural social change.

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